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Abstract 
The question to be examined in this paper is empirical evidence of path dependence of the 
Czech railways network, i.e. the question whether a way of founding of a particular line 
influence its economic efficiency and in that way the potential competition of train-operated-
companies on it? The study is divided into three parts, beginning by an outline of the most 
important principles of competition – the competition in the market, and the competition for 
the market. Further, eight ways of the origin of Czech railways is set out with regard to their 
present importance: it is presupposed that the way in which a given railway was established 
predestines its economic efficiency and in that way the potential competition for the market.      
 
Introduction 
Liberalisation and privatisation are the basic principles of contemporary reforms of railways 
in the EU (European Conference of Ministers of Transport 1993, European Commission 
2001). Liberalized transport services operated by private companies are viewed as a 
precondition of economic efficiency – contrary to a past experience of strong state regulation 
of railway services that created inefficient monopolies. The aim of liberalisation and 
privatisation is a higher level of economic efficiency of the transport services by means of a 
higher level of economic competition. The competition is often viewed as an instrument per 
se – i.e. the ability of competition to promote efficiency of services’ production is generally 
presupposed (e.g. Campos – Cantos 2000, Estache – Rus 2000).  
 
However, the competition is not natural within the railway service market. There are many 
differences and divergences, compared with other kinds of services. Railways are very 
specific even in comparison with other modes of transport; at the same time, transport 
services are a relatively specific part of the services segment, and services as such have 
striking peculiarities compared with general markets of goods. Historical experience verifies 
this notion – Gladstone in 1844 wrote: ”Railway competition are like lovers´ quarrels – breves 
inimicitiae, amicitiea sempiternae” (quoted by Cohn 1908, p. 520), later G. Cohn (1908, p. 
524) noted: “Free competition in the true sense of the term has never existed in the English 
railway system,” and finally E. B. Biggar (1917, p. 150) commented on the situation in 
Britain at the turn of the 19th century: ”... the waste of time, labour, money, and material in the 
illusory ´competition´ of the private companies (...) has been demonstrated beyond question in 
the marvellous achievements under unified national control.” The number of specific initial 
conditions means that a very abstract model can only be used with considerable difficulties to 
formulate alternatives of strategies of transport policy; it can only explain the function of a 
partial segment of railway transport (Campos – Cantos 2000, p. 171). That is why it is neither 
easy nor straight to use formal rules of competition as a tool to promote railway transport 
services’ efficiency.  The traditional point of view of competition has led to the presumption 
that railways operate within the condition of natural monopoly. 
 
Anyway, speaking about railway transport services, two basic forms of competition can be 
distinguished there: competition in the market, and competition for the market (Estache – Rus 
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2000, Quinet – Vickerman 2004). It is absolutely essential to emphasise which category of the 
competition is being talked about. Present strategies of railway reforms (as many studies show 
– e.g. Nash-Rivera-Trujillo 2004) are based on competition for the market for train-operated-
companies (TOC) as the general principle2. But what is the framework the TOCs are 
competing within? The framework of the railway service market is formed (or should be 
formed – as the EU railway reform’s strategy requires) by the railway network separated from 
the operations and regulated and (usually) owned by the state. That means, nowadays, that 
TOCs are about to compete for the market which is created by the railway network 
established 170 years ago. The core question is whether the network is something to be 
competed about. Naturally, there is no question of the technical condition of the infrastructure 
(even if the infrastructure is generally heavy underinvested as for Eastern Europe), the 
problem is the network itself – its compactness, its shape, connected points (places), its 
capacity, lines’ duplicity, congestion etc. The right question is whether the network is suitable 
for the TOCs’ business plans, as well as for potential passengers’ willingness. The bigger the 
gap is between the network’s possibilities (limits) and TOCs’ / passengers’ demand, the 
higher is the level of the network’s imperfection (i.e. inefficiency). Speaking about the 
government’s transport policy, the level of this inefficiency correlates to the amount of public 
subsidy the government pays to private TOCs to operate non-profit lines. 
 
The initial study I present here is divided into three parts, beginning by an outline of the most 
important principles of competition – the competition on the market, and the competition for 
the market. Further, I have set out eight ways of the origin of Czech railways with regard to 
their present importance. It is presupposed that the way in which a given railway was 
established predestines its economic efficiency, as well as its social significance within the 
national economy – and in that way the potential competition for the market. Each way of 
railways’ origin is elaborated in the second part of the study; resultant network of given 
railways according to their origin is compared with the density of transport on the Czech 
railway network. The last part of the study (conclusion) analyses the relationship between the 
identified ways of railways´ origin and the major presumption of their economic efficiency 
nowadays – their density of transport. The aim is to examine whether the present state of 
railways (regarding a potential competition for the market) is affected by their history. The 
study may offer an alternative view of a railway transport’s deficiency and may stimulate the 
debate on structure and quality of railway networks.  
 
1. Methodological concept 
Analysing deficiency (i.e. defect) of the network, quite interesting questions appear: why the 
network is not efficient (i.e. perfect)? Was the network perfect at the time of origin? What are 
the explanations of the defects? Is it possible to overcome these defects? Will introduction of 
competition for the market bring efficiency of transport services? Will it bring about a greater 
demand for railway services? The questions above could be answered taking into account the 
railway network’s history. Railway networks were created in two ways: (i) the state had 
planned lines and then built tracks on its own account (to run trains or to licence services) or it 
gave over concessions to private companies to build tracks according to orders; or contrary 
(ii) the state gave over privileges to private companies to plan, build and run railways without 
any restrictions as for route planning. As for continental Europe, the state usually combines 
both these attitudes towards the network creation, from the middle of the 1800s the first way 
prevailed.  Anyway, both the forms of competition appeared at the same time. The principle 
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of competition in the market influenced the creation of the network: railway companies 
competed with each other in building their own parallel (duplicate) lines.   
 
The hypothesis to be examined in this paper is an empirical evidence of path dependency of 
the Czech railways network, i.e. the question whether a way of founding of a particular line 
influences its economic efficiency and in that way the potential competition of TOCs’ on it. 
The study is of relevance because the Czech Republic is carrying out reforms of railway 
transport nowadays, attempting to improve efficiency of the railway services by means of 
competition. The economic efficiency of railways - in principle - doesn’t depend on direct 
costs only (i.e. on operation costs), but on the network’s shape and suitability as well. 
Previous studies (for a review see Nash et al. 2002) have suggested that efficiency of railways 
is connected with a shape of a railway network by means of economies of scale, density of 
transport, and network effect. Many studies report the density of transport is the major factor 
to make profit from railway operations (first analysed by Keeler 1974); other factors – 
economies of scale, network effect – are strong connected or simply based on the density of 
transport (Caves – Christensen – Swanson 1980, Winston 1985, Katz – Shapiro 1985, Walker 
1992, Callan – Thomas 1992, Cantos 2000). Even though the impact of history on the present 
state of railways is not easy to determine, the aim of this study is to elaborate on the idea that 
“history matters” – i.e. development of the network affects efficiency of operations at present. 
This interpretation is supported by earlier work of e.g. Liebowitz – Margolis 1995, or Puffert 
2002. 
 
Figure 1.1. The Czech railway network. 
 
Resource: ČD – Czech Railways 
  
The problem of the network’s imperfection could be shown on the example of the Czech 
Republic. Czech railways belong to the oldest on the Continent, the density of the Czech 
network is one of the highest (see Figure 1.1) – but the network’s shape and other attributes 
are inferior. The origin of the problems is – I assume – the way of the network’s creation and 
development. As for the shape of the Czech railways network, the most important was the 
period of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (the 1800s): the state changed the basic principles of 
the railway policy four times during 50 years. These changes – followed by the changes of 
political borders – resulted in an incompatible railway network consisting of several kinds of 
lines.   
 
The way of origin of the Czech railways could be divided into eight groups. Making that 
division I take into account the principal purpose of establishing a given railway (line). I have 
also confronted the purpose with the present conditions. The consequent distribution of the 
ways of origin is as follows: 
 
A – Railways built as an economically efficient business 
1. Lines built by private companies to make a profit (other than in the groups B and C) 
2. Lines built by the state as backbone lines 
B – Railways built as an economically inefficient business 
3. Lines built by private companies as duplicate connections 
4. Lines built by private companies on order from the state for strategic and/or political 
reasons 
5. Local lines built by private companies and supported by the state 
C – Railways that began to be inefficient due to changes of external conditions 
6. Coalmine railways (other than in section A) 
7. Branch lines built by private companies without state support 
8. Lines built in the time of different geopolitical circumstances 
 
Figure 1.2. Density of transport on the Czech railway network. 
 
 
Resource: ČD – Czech Railways 
 
The analysis I have carried out in this paper is based on the following assumption: parts of 
the Czech railway network that were built as inefficient lines or became inefficient lines due 
to changes of external conditions (i.e. railways included in the groups B and C) will be 
deficient even after the privatisation and liberalisation of services. TOCs will be interested in 
operating such lines only if the operations are heavily subsidised by the state. The analysis 
results in finding that there is a big disparity not only between services – e.g. between city-
suburb transport and long-distance inter-city transport – but between parts of the network, 
too. It is clear that we can easily see this disparity when measuring the density of traffic3 on 
the network (see Figure 1.2). The reason why I take into account historical circumstances of 
particular lines’ origin is the fact that the effect of privatisation and liberalisation of services 
is often overvalued by the government and other authorities. Naturally, it is a pretty hard 
work to predict the effect of liberalisation on the service’s efficiency – I do not doubt about 
the general positive influence of competition on the service’s efficiency, but in the case of the 
Czech railways this effect will work very differently within the network. The analysis of the 
lines’ origin can help to understand these differences and to predict potential changes in 
demand for transport services. 
 
2. Origin of the Czech railway network 
 
2.1 Lines built by private companies to make profit 
Private railways were built in Austria4 at the very beginning of ”the railway age” – i.e. 
between 1828 and 1841– without any state subsidy. The state licensed the railways without 
any restrictions or requests as for route planning. This means that the first lines were built 
clearly with regard to economic criteria and connected the most important cities of the 
economy. What is important, there were little to compete about as a railway service market 
was emerging gradually. The first railway was built from České Budějovice (Budweis) to 
Linz in 1828, crossing the Danube-Elbe watershed. The other railway – Kaiser Ferdinand 
Nord Bahn – connected Vienna with Brno in 1839. This railway became one of the biggest 
private enterprises on the Continent; finished in 1855, the line connected Vienna with Ostrava 
and Krakow.The next stage of building private railways began in 1855 and lasted till 1875. 
During this stage the state influenced routing of private lines according to political and 
strategic (nowadays we could say ”public”) concerns – e.g. passing a royal military 
stronghold, the line had to call there, etc. In return, the state began to support private railway 
companies using three ways: (i) guarantee of a minimal gain from invested capital (usually 
5%), (ii) direct subsidy, and (iii) purchase of railway shares by the state. The first private 
railways were followed after 1855 by several private lines connecting Vienna, České 
Budějovice (Budweis), Plzeň (Pilsen), Liberec (Reichenberg) and other major cities.    
 
The private railways built during the first or the second stage connected the most important 
regions of the country – speaking about economic, as well as political importance. During the 
last century a few was changed in this importance. Figure 2.1 shows the network of railways 
of the 1st group – these railways correspond to the lines of the highest transport density. 1,538 
km of these lines were built between 1828 and 1874 with the average length of 102.5 km. As 
for competition, these railways competed in the market freely (during the second stage, they 
competed with some slight restrictions as for routing). Anyway, it could hardly be described 
as a throat-cut competition – the railway companies didn’t compete each to other as the 
potential market was open and wide. Quite strong competition appeared in that time between 
railways at the one side and road service and navigation at the other side – this development 
was naturally based on technological advantage of railway transport. The network was shaped 
according to demand for transport services – what’s the most important there was not (and 
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still is not) the reason for any change of the demand other than a switch from the transport 
mode to another5. According to the initial assumption, this part of the network could be 
suitable for TOCs to compete for the market. 
 




2.2. Lines built by the state as backbone lines 
The state changed its policy towards the railways completely at the beginning of the 1840s: 
the empire’s authorities decided to build the railway network on their own account. The first 
state trunk line was opened in 1841 and connected Prague with Vienna via Olomouc. The 
next line, opened in 1849, made this connection shorter via Brno. The last state line was 
opened in 1850, connecting Prague with Dresden via Podmokly. The capital of Austria – 
Vienna – was connected with the Saxon capital – Dresden, and the capital of Prussia – Berlin. 
As for the Czech network, the lines made a real transport backbone of the economy from the 
west to the east, connecting the major north-south line from Vienna to Krakow.  
 
No other state railways were built after 1850. The Austrian state budget became short of 
money quite quickly (due to huge military expenses) – that is why the state changed its 
railway policy again (and again completely): further development of the railway network was 
based on private enterprise, slightly regulated and supported by the state (as I described in the 
section above). 472 km of the state trunk lines were built between 1845 and 1850 in the 
average length of 157.3 km. Figure 2.2 shows the network of railways of the 2nd group – 
again, these railways correspond to the lines of the highest transport density. As for 
competition, there was no competition in the market because the lines were planned and built 
by the state. These lines created the basic (backbone) network connecting the major economic 
and political centres – the demand for transport services was ensured, there is no reason for 
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any change of demand today (other than the switch to other transport mode as I mentioned 
above). According to the initial assumption we can again conclude, that this part of the 
network could be suitable for TOCs to compete for the market as well.       
 




2.3. Lines built by private companies as duplicate lines 
Railmania seized Austria in the 1870s; railway companies expanded their lines, trying to 
exploit the network effect and/or economies of scale. Because the most profitable (i.e. the 
most efficient) lines had already been engaged, the companies tried to find alternative 
connections between connected places, i.e. duplicates of existing profitable lines. The 
problem was the fact that there was no competition for the market there – just competition in 
the market. Each railway company owned its own infrastructure (tracks and signalling) – 
sharing a particular track together with another company was not an option. Let us take into 
account that at the same time the state subsidised private companies to build and run its own 
lines. That all together led to establishing many duplicate lines. Their existence resulted from 
competition in the market – but in unequal conditions (due to non-transparent interventions 
and support of the state).  
 
The major problem of duplicate lines is their operational inefficiency, as the lines were built 
on less convenient grounds. The very typical duplicate lines were built by the Österreichishe 
Nordwestbahn company at the beginning of the 1870s. The lines connected Vienna with 
Dresden, crossing the Moravian Highlands and by-passing Prague – that is why the lines 
recorded less operational efficiency and less density of transport.  
 
Figure 2.3 shows the network of railways of the 3rd group – these railways correspond to the 
lines with low density of transport. 801 km of these lines were built between 1869 and 1874 
in the average length of 101.1 km. This part of the network resulted from a very strong 
competition in the market – however, the competition had evolved under special 
circumstances which I mentioned above (non-transparent subsidy from the state). Nowadays, 
there would be little interest of TOCs to compete for the market there; in the same time the 
state will not be probably interested in support of these lines due to their little public 
importance.  
 




2.4. Lines built by private companies on order from the state 
The state – especially the military authority – recognised the importance of railways for 
transport of troops during a war time (namely after the lost war against Prussia in 1866). That 
is why the state charged railway companies to build on their own account several lines which 
had little economic but great strategic sense. Inefficient lines and/or duplicate lines appeared 
within the Czech network. One of the longest duplicate strategic lines built according to the 
political order doubled the old line from Vienna to Krakow along the section which went too 
close to the Prussian frontier. Several other lines had to be built to reinforce connection with 
strategic friend-countries – Bavaria and Saxony. All of them went across hilly areas – these 
lines have little economic importance but high operating costs.        
 
461 km of these lines were built between 1870 and 1892 with the average length of 30.7 km. 
Figure 2.4 shows the network of railways of the 4th group – these railways correspond to the 
lines with a low density of transport. As for competition, there was not any competition in the 
market there and there will hardly be the competition for the market there. TOCs will not be 
interested in operating on these lines, authorities will not be (or should not be) interested in 
subsidising operations on these lines. 
 




2.5. Local lines built by private companies and supported by the state. 
The building of main lines was nearly completed at the end of the 1870s, but a lot of towns 
still lay out of the railway network. There was a problem there because connecting of these 
towns with the main lines of the network was not seen as a good business – that is why it was 
hardly possible to involve private capital in such business without any state support. To solve 
the problem the state issued a special law in 1880 which supported building of the 2nd class 
railways – i.e. local, branch, regional lines etc. The support had two forms: (i) financial 
subsidies, and (ii) technical allowances. As for the financial subsidies, the state guaranteed a 
minimal gain from invested capital, supplied railway companies with capital (a company had 
to invest 25% of the total amount of capital only, the rest was provided by the state without 
interest), the loan had to be paid back in 90 years, and so on. As for the technical allowances, 
local railways could be built according to lower standards compared with main lines: light 
track, turns of small diameter, slope up to 50‰, maximum speed up to 15 mph, no signalling 
due to a presupposed low density of transport (of about 1 or 2 pairs of trains a day). As for 
planning and building the local railways, the key role was played by local lobbies: there had 
to be someone there interested in building a local line to make an extra profit from the new 
line – an owner of a local (usually small) factory, sugar mill, sawmill, quarry, etc. as well as a 
big farm. An important role was played by local politicians as well – they tried to attract 
potential voters by giving them a gift: a new railway to their sleepy town. The principle of the 
state guarantee of the minimal gain from invested capital appeared to be an essential motive 
for building local railways. Comparing the local lines built in Bohemia6 – where the gain was 
guaranteed – with local lines built in Moravia7 – where the gain was not guaranteed – we can 
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see a significant difference: the total / average length of local lines in Bohemia was about 
1,900 km / 33 km in contrast with 261 km / 14 km in Moravia.  
 
Altogether, the local railways were built according to particular interests of local lobbies and 
politicians, but on the account of the state; at the same time the state had little chance to 
influence routing of the local lines. This development resulted in building local lines which 
were deficient even at the time of opening, which were able to pay back neither interest nor 
the credit from the state, and served not public demand, but private interest of local lobbies. 
Not surprisingly the local railways are quite inefficient nowadays, as well as they were in the 
history (many empirical studies concluded this fact generally – e.g. Gathon – Pastieau 1995 
or Campos – Cantos 2000, p. 233). 
 
3,039 km of these lines were built between 1871 and 1914 with the average length of 30.4 
km. As for competition, there was a very strong competition for the state support there as well 
as the competition in the market – but no competition for the market. Density of transport is 
low on the Czech local lines (see Figure 2.5), operating costs are comparatively high, as well 
as operation’s inefficiency is quite high – that is why there will be little interest of TOCs to 
compete for the local lines’ market if the operations were not heavy subsidised by the state. 
 




2.6. Coalmine railways.  
At the very beginning of the railway age many lines were built to connect coal mines with 
major cities and steel mills. Coal used to be the most important commodity transported on 
railways: coal was burnt in engines to move trains, coal became the only fuel in steel mills – 
and steel became the most important material for construction of rail tracks, as well as rolling 
stock (Hlavačka 1990) – most of industrial production was directly based on coal. It is clear 
then that building and running of lines to transport coal was a good business – coalmine 
railways were the most profitable ones in the 1800s (Hlavačka 1990). That is why there was 
a very hard competition in the market: many railway companies tried to build a line 
connecting collieries with towns. The first lines were quite short (Brno – Rosice 20 km, 
Prague – Kladno 30 km, Pilsen – Stupno 20 km, etc.), later coalmine lines were built to 
farther destinations (Pilsen – Most 141 km, Řetenice – Liberec 145 km, etc.) and abroad, 
namely to Saxony. The competition between railway companies was neither even nor fair: 
the companies formed local monopolies buying collieries, excluded competitors (i.e. other 
mines) from the market by setting up high tariffs, or by lobbying for additional by-state-
guaranteed privileges, etc. 
 
Because the coalmine lines were so profitable, the competition in the market resulted in 
building several duplicate lines, connecting e.g. North-Bohemian mines with Prague four 
times and with Liberec twice. In the time when the whole economy depended on coal, all the 
coalmine lines were profitable, i.e. efficient – but there is little to transport nowadays: former 
coalmine lines cross the country by-passing towns and connecting collieries and steel mills 
which were shut down years ago. Of course, there are several important and profitable coal 
mines as well as steel mills and chemical works in present – these huge plants are well served 
by several main lines I gathered into the 1st and/or the 2nd groups: Prague – Olomouc, Břeclav 
– Ostrava, Ústí n/L – Chomutov, etc. 
 
Figure 2.6 shows the lines of coalmine railways which were built just to transport coal (i) 
from collieries which were shut down, or (ii) to places where there is no demand for coal 
presently (i.e. big cities without heavy industry based on coal – chemical works, steel mills, 
etc.). 1,083 km of these lines were built between 1855 and 1911 with the average length of 
47.1 km. Operating these lines is inefficient today, there is no relevant demand for transport 
services – the coalmine railways belong to the lines with the lowest density of transport. 
There will be little interest of TOCs to compete for the market to operate these lines – and 
there will be little interest of the state or local authorities to support operations on these lines. 
 
Figure 2.6. Coalmine railways.    
 
 
2.7. Branch lines built by private companies without state support. 
Railway companies built branch lines from 1870s, believing it would increase their income 
from network effect and give them a competitive advantage. It was believed that branch lines 
would attract further passengers and increase haulage on main (trunk) lines. Even if these 
lines were built by private companies without a direct state subsidy, the state supported them 
indirectly – by technical allowances in the same way I described in section 2.5, which in fact 
resulted in higher operational costs and lower effectiveness. As for the routing of these lines 
the major motive was the same as I described for the local lines: serving local factories, sugar 
mills, farms, etc. Putting together, the branch lines were built according to particular interests 
of a local-industry lobby, more or less affecting the density of transport on trunk lines. As for 
competition, there was a very strong competition in the market as railway companies tried to 
increase their network to the prejudice of the other competitors.  
 
903 km of these lines were built between 1871 and 1911 with the average length of 15.3 km. 
Nowadays, the branch railways are quite inefficient, the density of transport is low there, (see 
Figure 2.7), operating costs are high – that is why there will be little interest of TOCs to 
compete for the branch lines’ market if the operations were not heavy subsidised by the state.   
 
Figure 2.7. Branch lines built by private companies without state support. 
 
 
   
2.8. Lines built at the time of different geopolitical circumstances. 
The Czech territory went through difficult political development during the 1800s and 1900s 
– it used to belong to five entities: the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Czechoslovakia, the 
protectorate, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Czech Republic. This development was 
followed by (i) changes of frontiers, as well as (ii) changes of natural economic and social 
relations, and resulted in re-orientation of the routes of the main North-South connection (i.e. 
Vienna – Prussia / Galicia) to the East-West (Moscow – Slovakia – Prague); finally, the 
routes covered widespread destinations after the collapse of the Iron Curtain in 1989. 
 
These changes resulted in construction of several lines which lost their importance in the 
following periods. Quite a long line (of the length of 150 km) was built to connect West-
Bohemian towns (Rakovník and Beroun) with Vienna directly, i.e. by passing Pilsen, in 1876. 
The line is interesting because it was the only one built by the state on its own account after 
1855 and before nationalisation in the 20th century. Other lines were built in Northern 
Bohemia (Sudetenland) to connect towns inhabited by German-speaking people with their 
neighbouring towns in Prussia and Saxony. Quite an important line (of course temporary 
only) was built by the state during the period of the protectorate in the 1940s. Nazi Germany 
annexed 35% of the Czech territory and many lines were disconnected, including the most 
important one from Prague to Brno and Ostrava. That is why the state decided to build a new 
line from Prague to Brno. Even though the total length (256 km) of the new connection is 
absolutely the same as the old one (built by the state in 1845), operating costs nearly tripled 
due to the crossing of the Moravian Highlands in the length of 120 km. Nowadays, the line is 
deficient, duplicating the backbone line, having a low density of transport. Similar lines were 
built to connect Slovakia after WW1 – and resulted in similar troubles.  
 
914 km of these lines were built between 1859 and 1953 with the average length of 45.7 km. 
Times are changing. Some of these lines used to be subject to strong competition in the 
market and used to be quite profitable, some of them were built by order from the state and 
were never profitable. But all of them will be hardly efficient in the future – competition for 
the market would have to be heavily supported by the state. Figure 2.8 shows the network of 
railways of the 8th group – these railways correspond to the lines with a low density of 
transport. 
 




The aim of the study was to examine whether present state of railways (regarding a potential 
competition for the market) is affected by their history - empirical evidence validates this 
assumption. To conclude: comparing the density of transport on the Czech railway network 
we can see the differences among the lines according to their origin. The railways of group A 
– measuring together 2,010 km – correlate to the lines with the highest density of transport 
(Figure 3.1), contrary to the railways of groups B and C – measuring 7,166 km – which 
correlate to the lines with a low density of transport (Figure 3.2). This finding corresponds to 
the initial hypothesis: if a given line was built as inefficient or if conditions of profitability 
waned, the line is inefficient at the present as well. I have found out that the deficiency of 
particular lines was affected by circumstances of competition in the market at the time of 
origin. Present-time strategies of revitalisation of railway transport are based on competition 
for the market – the study has shown a paradox in the Czech network: TOCs will compete 
before all for the lines which were not built as a result of competition in the market, i.e. the 
lines of group A. The lines whose origin resulted from a very strong competition on the 
market (as well as the lines which are odd nowadays – i.e. group 8) will be less interesting for 
TOCs to compete for the market.   
 
This study does not claim to be able to solve the problem of railway networks by means of 
historical method. There are obvious limitations to historical method; discussion of them is 
beyond the scope of this study. However, the questions raised by this study warrant further 
investigation. The railway problem is a complex one – analysing networks, we should take 
into account their path dependence. Further research is required in order to quantify the 
effects discussed above. The conclusions presented here may have quite important 
implications for development of railways’ reform strategies. 
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